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An empirical study of the determinants of UK oil and gas voluntary 
disclosures 
 
Abstract   
 
Significant market value of energy firms is derived from their physical oil and gas 
reserves, assets not recorded on their statements of financial position. This paper 
provides empirical evidence regarding voluntary disclosure of such reserves in 
line with UK SORP/OFR guidelines from both a quantitative and qualitative 
perspective.  The paper seeks to inform the IASB’s on-going consideration of 
reporting of mineral resources. The researchers adopt an empirical analysis of the 
previously un-researched UK reporting environment. Listed companies are 
considered to evidence forms of reserve disclosure with a logistical regression 
approach to measure determinants of reporting. The risk associated with mineral 
reporting reserves is hypothesised as the key disclosure driver whilst controlling 
for other relevant variables. Motivations for disclosure are considered. The 
majority of firms disclosed reserve quantities in some form but only a minority 
disclosed in line with recommended practice. Quality of disclosure is more 
variable between companies. The findings indicate that a voluntary disclosure 
approach is ineffective, partially explained by agency related behaviour. Risk, 
proxied by stage of production, drives reserve disclosure showing that producer 
firms are more likely to disclose reserve quantum balances and of a significantly 
higher quality. The qualitative attributes of information reported have not 
previously been tested.   
 
Key words: Reserve quantum, Voluntary disclosure, Extractive Industry, Risk 
JEL classification: G38, M40, Q40 
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I. Introduction 
 
A significant amount of the value of energy firms is derived from mineral 
reserves not necessarily recorded in reported financial statements, yet such 
reserves drive economic activity (Taylor et al., 2012). Information on such 
reserves can provide shareholders with data regarding the likelihood of positive 
future cash flows (Berry and Wright, 2001), thus affecting the share price and 
market value (Berry et al., 1997). Reserve related key performance indicators 
(KPIs) also provide information content (Spear and Lee, 1999) such as reserve 
replacement ratios (RRRs). Oil and gas reserve quantum information can be used 
for numerous reasons including informing mergers, acquisition and disposition 
decisions, providing security for principal and interest in debt covenant and 
lending decisions based on a percentage of proved developed reserves (Haines, 
1999). Future corporate success is dependent upon a continuum of mineral 
reserves, thus numerous stakeholders rely on such reserve data. Research into 
disclosure behaviour is critical where stakeholders need and use such data (Slack 
and Shrives, 2010) which is clearly apposite to oil and gas reserves. However, the 
reliability of reserve quantum data is problematic with uncertainty inherent in its 
estimation.  
 
The UK’s Oil Industry Accounting Committee’s SORP (OIAC, 2001), last 
updated in 2001, provides guidance on a range of additional voluntary disclosures 
for the industry. Further disclosures were also set out in the Operating and 
Financial Review (OFR), introduced on a voluntary basis in 1993, made 
mandatory for listed companies in 2005 but removed as a statutory requirement 
for quoted companies in 2006 becoming again a voluntary reporting statement of 
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best practice. However the UK’s Companies Act 2006 enhancement of the 
business review reporting requirements specified the contents of the business 
review required to be included in the directors’ report, becoming effective for 
financial years beginning on or after 1 October 2007. Thus the financial reporting 
for year ends in the calendar year 2007 represents one of the few periods that had 
only voluntary disclosure since the OFR (ASB, 2005) was voluntary and the 
business review had not yet been enacted.  It is for this reason that our study uses 
data for 2007 year ends as this represents a rare opportunity to examine 
disclosures in a purely voluntary environment.  
 
This paper provides insight into voluntary reserves disclosure within the UK oil 
and gas sector by considering firstly information regarding reserve quantum 
balances seen to be vital to stakeholders (Berry et al., 1997; Berry and Wright, 
2001). Disclosure is then considered in regard to recommended practice as 
detailed in the SORP and OFR which is viewed here as a proxy for qualitative 
best practice, as outlined below: 
• Disclosure of oil and gas reserve balances (required by SORP, s246) 
• Disclosure of balances by geographic region (required by SORP, s246) 
• Statement of the source of the estimates (required by SORP, s247) 
• Disclosure relating to audit of reserves, specifically the name and qualification 
of an independent expert who reviewed the internal data (required by OFR, p77) 
• Disclosure of the basis for arriving at the net quantities (required by SORP, 
s247) 
• Application of an accepted practice for defining reserve quantum (e.g. SORP 
rules, s12, OFR p77 requiring proved (P1) and probable (P2) reserves) 
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• Disclosure of the movement in the net quantities of reserves (required by 
SORP, s249) 
• Disclosure of KPIs (required by OFR, p77) 
 
It should be noted that the UK stance differs from that of other jurisdictions most 
notably the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The IASB’s IFRS 6 
Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources (IASB, 2004) “did little to 
regularise varied accounting practice…..enabling companies to continue reporting 
in their preferred mode” (Cortese et al., 2010, p. 76). The IASB established a 
working group that released a discussion paper in April 2010 (IASB, 2010) with 
reserve quantum reporting still not standardised nor mandatory. Managers may 
therefore voluntarily disclose information where perceived benefits exceed costs 
(Ferguson et al., 2002) for example weighing the benefits of reducing the 
organisation’s cost of capital (Verrecchia, 1983) with the proprietary cost of 
providing information to competitors (Ellis et al., 2012). 
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that disclosure is likely to differ among industries 
reflecting their own unique characteristics, with leading firms in an industry 
providing a mimetic effect. Prior cross-sectoral studies on voluntary disclosure 
provide inconclusive and contradictory relationships between industrial sectors 
and the level of voluntary disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003) explained by 
specialised and unique accounting (Shevlin, 1996) and industry-specific contexts. 
This paper considers factors influencing reserve quantum within one single 
industrial context, in a distinctive industry with its inherent high-risk and 
geological specialism.  
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This paper makes a number of contributions to previous research. Firstly, prior 
studies are limited in number, are Australian centric and are broader extractive 
industry studies (e.g. Taylor et al., 2012). This paper considers the characteristics 
and determinants of disclosure in the hitherto unresearched UK oil and gas 
context.  Second, the paper introduces a new measure for the quality of reserve 
quantum disclosure locating our analysis within the context of the voluntary 
SORP/OFR guidelines, recognising the risks inherent in the industry and 
identifying the determinants of disclosure. Finally, the IASB project on extractive 
industries is long-running and has made very little progress (Cortese et al., 2010) 
resulting in disparate global reserve quantum reporting practice, a mix of 
voluntary and mandatory disclosure and of varying quality.  The paper in 
exploring the current practice of UK companies aims to inform potential future 
regulation of reserves disclosures. 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section II reviews relevant literature and 
develops the research hypotheses. Section III describes our research design. 
Section IV reports on the current reserve disclosure practices of 86 UK 
companies. Section V reports the empirical analysis for the determinants of the 
voluntary disclosure of oil and gas reserves. Drawing on these findings, 
implications for the future regulation of reserves disclosure are discussed in 
Section VI.  Section VII concludes and offers suggestions for future research. 
 
II. Hypotheses development: theory and prior research 
Agency theory is considered to be a suitable theoretical framework for examining 
reserve reporting in annual reports of oil and gas companies (Taylor et al., 2012). 
 7 
Voluntary disclosure of reserve information can reduce information asymmetry 
(Boone, 1998) management discretion weighing the agency-related costs and 
benefits of disclosure.  Agency costs include providing the reserve information of 
an appropriate quality which is a non-trivial cost particularly when reducing data 
uncertainty through incurring significant monitoring costs including data 
verification by qualified geologists (Mirza and Zimmer, 2001). Proprietary costs 
must also be considered regarding competitors or dissident shareholders 
(Craswell and Taylor, 1992) using the information adversely to the firm’s 
prospects as well as stakeholders in litigation cases. Agency related benefits 
include a reduction in the organisation’s cost of capital by reducing risk 
(Verrecchia, 1983) and reducing contracting costs with agents (Craswell and 
Taylor, 1992).   
 
An understanding of the risks related to reserve quantum is fundamental to the 
debate on recognition and reporting. The industry is regarded as being high risk 
along the entire value chain with investors requiring a related high return. 
Stakeholders recognise that reserve quantum information provided is inherently 
uncertain, with risk being highest at the exploration stage and reducing once 
production has commenced (Wise and Spear, 2002) as often estimates are 
updated by continuous information upgrades. Certainty regarding the reserves 
needs to be considered regarding the feasibility of oil and gas reservoirs from 
various standpoints including technical (mining, metallurgical and environmental 
aspects) and commercial (such as economic, legal, marketing, social and 
governmental) viability. At one end of the spectrum, reserves can be regarded as 
contingent resources and, at the other, they can be classified as proved developed 
reserves with a high probability of being produced and marketed. Companies 
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attempt to reduce and manage their exposure to risk through for example 
diversification, such as holding broad portfolios of projects and participating in 
joint ventures to share the risk.  
 
The specific risks affecting the industry and reserve estimation occur from the 
point of exploration to the final marketplace, including extractive risks and 
commercial, political and financing risks. In regard to extractive risk, exploration 
is regarded as the greatest risk as most acquisitions and exploration activities 
prove to be non-productive (Brooks, 1987), although this risk can be reduced by 
engineering studies and actual production history. Geological risk relates to the 
location of the reserves e.g. an offshore shallow reservoir is less risky than a 
deep-water reservoir. Production risk is a failure to produce the quantity or 
quality required from the exploration sampling readings whilst logistical risk 
relates to the movement of oil and gas reserves from remote geographical sites.  
 
Commercial risk recognises the problem of selling the reserves at a profitable 
price with oil companies being price takers and the market being unpredictable, 
reserves not being considered proved if commercially non-viable and 
corporations postponing activities in a low price environment (Haines, 1999). 
Political risk may be a critical factor to many oil fields where contractual 
arrangements exist with host governments where political instability provides a 
real threat to mineral extraction.  Financing risk refers to a company’s ability to 
raise capital and the downside impact of interest rates, inflation, and exchange 
rate variations. 
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This paper hypothesises that there is an inverse relationship between the risk 
relating to reserve quantum and the level of disclosure. Stage of extraction is used 
to proxy for the risks attached to reserve quantum disclosure as previously tested 
on reserve quantum in the Australian extractive industries (e.g. Mirza, 1999). 
Mirza and Zimmer (2001) linked the stage of production with the level of 
uncertainty surrounding the reserve estimates distinguishing between those 
organisations in production with relatively low levels of uncertainty as compared 
to those in pre-production, a methodology that is also adopted in this study. This 
assumes that firms at the production stage of the value chain are less uncertain of 
their reserve quantum and are thus more willing to disclose data as the agency 
costs e.g. litigation costs and reputational loss are outweighed by the benefits. In 
categorising firms re stage of production a distinction is made between those not 
yet at production stage (purely exporation) and those who have some level of 
production, with its related greater certainty of data re quantum, recognising that 
these firms may also be simultaneously explorers in other geographic areas. 
 
Our dependent variables, represented by the disclosure of reserve quantum 
balances and the quality of reserves disclosures in UK annual reports, are thus set 
in relation to uncertainty as proxied by stage in the value chain:  
 
H1: Producer firms are more likely to disclose reserve quantum balances than 
developer firms in the in the oil and gas industry. 
 
H2: The quality of reserves disclosure for the producer firms is likely to be 
significantly greater than the quality of reserves disclosure for the developer 
firms in the oil and gas industry. 
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III. Research design 
 
Sample 
All forms of data reaching the public can be considered as part of the 
accountability discharge activities of an entity with annual reports signalling to 
the readers important issues to both internal and external stakeholders (Guthrie et 
al., 2004). The annual report is seen as a statutory report, within the public 
domain, regularly produced and regarded as an important document in the 
construction of the entity’s social imagery (Neimark, 1992). Therefore, the annual 
report is used in this paper to analyse oil and gas information. This study focuses 
on one industrial sector due to the unique nature of the resource base under 
consideration. It also focuses on one geographic region in order to avoid global 
differences with respect to such factors as culture, banking and finance systems, 
legislative and accounting systems. The analysis is undertaken for the annual 
reports of 2007 because that year represents a rare opportunity to examine 
disclosures in a purely voluntary environment. In addition, this period is not 
complicated by variables relating to the subsequent financial crisis potentially 
impacting upon disclosure.  
 
Companies were selected from the London Stock Exchange (LSE) industry 
classification code 533 (oil and gas) and the PLUS SX market in London. This 
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resulted in a final sample of 86 companies: 18 listed on the main LSE, 65 
companies listed on the AIM and 3 on the PLUS stock market. This selection of 
all public limited companies in the UK allows for a wide spread regarding size, 
stage of production and profitability as suggested by Clatworthy and Jones (2006) 
who argue that qualitative studies should include all companies.  
 
Dependent variables 
 
The disclosure of reserve quantity balances is measured by depicting factual 
information regarding whether reserves are recorded in the company annual 
report. Therefore, we use a dichotomous variable coded as one for firms that 
disclose reserves information reports and zero otherwise. Instances where 
companies have not discovered reserves and have stated so are regarded as 
disclosers as this information is valuable to users (Craswell and Taylor, 1992). 
 
Quality of reserve disclosure is measured by capturing all qualitative attributes of 
information per the recommended practice outlined in the SORP/OFR (as detailed 
in section 2). The quality of reserve disclosure is derived by considering these 
dimensions and categorising each company in terms of whether the company 
disclosed in line with the SORP/OFR requirements, whether they provided only 
the reserve balances or did not provide any reserve quantum information. The 
scoring system is summarised as: 
Score 0: No information provided on reserves  
Score 1: Information provided shows only balances of reserves  
Score 2: Information as required by SORP and OFR (as included 
substantively in the bullet points in section 2) 
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This scoring methodology is similar to that used in other disclosure work (e.g. 
Eng and Mak, 2003).  
Independent variable 
Following Mirza and Zimmer (2001), we classify firms in our sample as 
producers (firms that have started production and earned revenue from the sale of 
the product) and developers (firms that have neither started production nor derive 
revenue from the sale of the product). We use a dichotomous variable coded 
either one for producer firms or zero for developer firms. 
 
Control variables 
 
From prior studies, four variables can be seen to be influential in oil and gas 
reserve accounting and are therefore controlled for in the multivariate analyses. 
Firm size is a widely used variable in prior research on determinants of corporate 
reporting (e.g. Marshall and Weetman, 2007). It can be conjectured that larger 
firms may provide more reserve information due to the costs of collecting the 
information being relatively greater for smaller firms affecting their disclosure 
(Singhvi and Desai, 1971). Prior empirical studies consistently find a positive 
association between levels of reserve quantum disclosure and firm size (e.g. 
Taylor et al., 2012). Stock exchange listing was previously only tested as a 
predictor of reserve quantum disclosure based on overseas listings (Mirza and 
Zimmer, 2001; Taylor et al 2011) with companies listed on major stock 
exchanges more likely to disclose due to greater information requirements set by 
such institutions. This concurs with prior general studies where companies 
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attaining Stock Exchange listing status, whether domestically or internationally, 
provide higher quantities of disclosure reflecting regulatory requirements for 
more information (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). This study will focus on the 
variability of disclosure between different levels of exchange within the one 
country testing to consider if this influence is also found domestically for oil and 
gas reserve reporting. 
 
The quality of external audit is also considered a factor affecting disclosure (e.g. 
Abdelsalam and Weetman, 2007). Auditors may play a role in improving firms’ 
reporting strategies, aware of reputational loss of being associated with clients 
with poor reporting practices, this being more prevalent amongst brand conscious 
higher quality audit firms. Companies may choose a high quality audit firm and 
proper disclosure simultaneously, signalling to the market high quality 
information disclosure. According to prior research on oil and gas reserves 
disclosure, the association between the quality of external auditor and reserves 
reporting is mixed, ranging from a positive relationship (Taylor et al., 2012) to no 
statistically significant association e.g. Mirza and Zimmer (2001). Gearing has 
been tested in prior accounting disclosure studies, the relationship being found to 
be inconsistent (e.g. Marshall and Weetman, 2007; Bharath et al., 2009). A 
positive relationship can be postulated regarding reduced debt related costs, but 
alternatively high gearing companies may share private information with lenders 
and reduce public disclosure. Within the oil and gas reserves arena the research 
points to a negative relationship (e.g. Mirza and Zimmer, 2001). Table 1 details 
the descriptive statistics for all variables. 
Enter table 1 here 
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Validity and reliability 
 
A central problem of content analysis is related to the data reduction stage when 
the whole text of a report is classified into a much smaller set of content 
categories. Weber (1990, p. 12) argues that “to make valid inferences from the 
text, it is important that the classification procedure be reliable in the sense of 
being consistent: different people code the same text in the same way”. Following 
Marshall and Weetman (2007) we controlled for consistency for scoring annual 
reports by having the principal researcher score all disclosures using an agreed 
questionnaire instrument, and controlled for errors of judgement by having the 
second and fourth researchers carry out sample checking (eight companies). Any 
differences were noted and amendments were made where necessary to the 
questionnaire instrument.  
 
A second problem of content analysis deals with the validity of variables used to 
identify the content classifications, the study accurately assessing the specific 
concept the researcher is attempting to measure. Following prior disclosure 
studies (e.g.. Botosan, 1997), we identify the correlation between our disclosure 
scores and firm characteristics identified in prior studies to be associated with the 
level of corporate disclosures. We find that our disclosure measures are highly 
correlated with stage in production, firm size, UK stock listing, gearing and audit 
quality (see section 6.1). 
 
Basic regression model 
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Following prior disclosure literature, we use logistic regression analysis to 
measure the determinants of reserve balance reporting.  We also use the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression analysis to measure the determinants of the quality 
of reserve reporting. We use the following formula to test our research hypothesis 
for disclosure of reserve quantum (DISC) and reserve quality (DISC QUALITY) 
the former shown as: 
 
1 2 3 4 5DISC a b EXPRO b TA b EXCH b DE b AUD e                                                                      
 
Where:  
 
DISC  is the reserve disclosure score, a dichotomous variable is coded as one for 
firms that disclose reserves information in their annual reports and zero 
otherwise.  
EXPRO  represents the stage of the value chain in the oil and gas production 
process. A dichotomous variable is coded as one for producer firms and zero for 
developer firms.  
TA  is total assets, using the logarithm of total assets. 
EXCH  represents UK stock listing being a dichotomous categorical variable with 
a score of 1 for firms listed in LSE, 2 for firms listed in AIM and 3 for firms 
listed in PLUS.  
DE  represents gearing and is the debt to equity ratio.  
AUD  is the audit quality variable with auditor size being used to proxy quality, 
specifically Big Four (coded as 1) versus non-Big Four (coded as 0). 
 a is the  intercept. e  is the standard error of residual for firm i in year t. 
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IV. Current reserve disclosure practices of 86 oil and gas UK companies 
 
Reporting of oil and gas reserves balances  
 
The dependent variable in this study is disclosure of reserves in the firm’s annual 
report. Table 2 indicates that 75.9% of the companies disclose their reserves 
(excluding those stating they had zero reserves) which is slightly higher than 
Mirza (1999) who recorded  69% of firms disclosing.  The quality of disclosure is 
skewed towards the lower end of information provision. Excluding the companies 
that stated they have no reserves, 24.1% provided no disclosure whatsoever, 
50.6% only partially met SORP/OFR requirements and 25.3% disclosed within 
the SORP/OFR requirements.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 
Reporting by geographic region 
 
Panel A Table 3 reports on the disclosure of commercial oil and gas reserves by 
geographic region. The analysis ignores those companies where there are either 
no reserves to disclose or where companies have decided not to show the reserve 
quantum. Of those who disclose their reserves 77.8% also disaggregate the 
information by geographic area. 
 
Table 3 about here 
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Statement of the source of the estimates  
 
Disclosing the source provides the reader with confidence regarding the expertise 
of the preparers such as outside consulting firms qualified in the preparation of 
data but also providing an independent assessment. The majority of companies 
(68.2%) that disclosed their reserves also disclosed the source as detailed in Panel 
B Table 3.  
 
Audit of reserve quantum 
 
Of particular interest regarding the source of the estimates, particularly in the 
light of recent reserve overstatements, is the level of independent review of the 
quantum figures. Panel C Table 3 indicates that of those disclosing reserves, 
52.3% used outside independent advisers whilst 38.1% appeared to have no audit 
of the figures.  
 
Disclosure of basis for arriving at reserves 
 
Detailing the basis of the estimates allows users to gauge the level of certainty 
surrounding these estimates. Of the companies disclosing reserves 67.7% also 
stated their basis of arriving at their estimates  regarding the definitions being 
applied (Panel D Table 3). 
 
The application of an accepted practice for defining reserve quantum 
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Panel E Table 3 shows the differing definitions adopted by disclosers of reserve 
quantum. The results show that 84.1% of those disclosing reserves apply 
definitions commensurate with the SORP/OFR requirements, with 38.1% 
providing additional information in addition to the SORP/OFR definitions. This 
would suggest that more standardisation of disclosure is warranted in order to 
assist the users of the information.   
 
Movement in the net quantities  
 
The SORP/OFR recommends that the changes to the reserves within a year 
should also be reported with a supporting narrative of significant changes e.g. 
extensions, discoveries and production. Of the companies disclosing their reserve 
balances, only 21 (33.3%) broke these figures down further regarding in-year 
movements per Panel F Table 3. 
 
Disclosure of Key Performance Indicators 
Table 4 shows that the majority of companies made no attempt to disclose any of 
the key indicators. For the RRR, 94.0% did not disclose; for proved 
developed/proved undeveloped and years of oil reserves the non-disclosure is 
100.0% and 98.8% respectively.  
Table 4 about here 
 
V. Empirical analysis: Determinants of the extent and the quality of reserves 
disclosure 
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Correlation analysis 
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows the distribution of variables is not normally 
distributed, thus requiring non-parametric statistical tests. An initial test for 
correlation is conducted that examines the simple relationships between the 
dependent variables (disclosure) and the independent variables. The common test 
for correlations using Spearmen’s correlation coefficient is considered 
inappropriate as this method is not suitable in measuring the association between  
binary variables. Therefore a two-tailed Kendall's tau-a is applied this being a 
non-biometric test. Table 5 shows the correlation analysis. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Table 5 shows that the disclosure of reserve balances and quality of reserve 
quantum disclosure is positively related to whether the company is at an 
exploration or production stage. The correlation between the stage in production 
and reserve balance disclosure is 0.393 with a p-value of less than 0.01, while the 
correlation between the stage in production and disclosure quality is 0.455 with a 
p-value of less than 0.01. The table also shows that the reserve balance 
disclosures are positively associated with firm size, UK stock exchange listing 
and audit quality and are statistically significant at the 1% level. Gearing is 
positively correlated with both the reserve balance and the quality of disclosure 
but is only statistically significant with our measure of reserve quantum 
disclosure quality at the 1% level and statistically insignificant with our measure 
of reserve quantum balance disclosure. Table 5 shows that the correlation 
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between the independent variables is not of the significant magnitude of .8 (Field, 
2005) and thus there is not a multi-collinearity problem although there are 
significant relationships particularly related to size and listing (TA) and (EXCH) 
(r = 0.527, p < .01) and siza and audit (TA) and (AUD) (r = 0.524, p < .01) which 
may affect the understanding of the multivariate test output. A further test 
checked the variance inflation factors in regard to the regression diagnostics. The 
highest VIF was 2.49 for TA with Field (2005) indicating that values above ten 
would give cause for concern regarding multicollinearity.  
Regression analyses 
 
Determinants of reserve balance disclosure. We use binary logistic regression 
because our dependent variable of the reserve quantum disclosure is dichotomous 
(e.g. disclosure/non-disclosure of reserves) and the predictor variables are either 
continuous (for example total assets) or categorical (e.g. exploration/production). 
Binary logistical regression modelling allows for the calculation of a simple 
proportion or probability that depicts the correct prediction of a response category 
for an individual case (the likelihood of disclosure of reserve quantum occurring, 
given the different independent variables of an organisation). The regression 
equation thus formed reads:  
 
p = e α + β1X1 +β2X2 + …..βkXk 
          1 + e α + β1X1 +β2X2 + …..βkXk 
Where p = probability that the outcome Y (disclosure) equals 1, 0 < p < 1 
α = “intercept”, the probability when all explanatory variables are 0 
βi = regression coefficients, i = 1, 2…..k 
Xi = explanatory variable i 
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Using this methodology it is possible to establish which variable coefficients (β) 
are influential in predicting the categorical outcome. This study, as with prior 
studies into reserve quantum, is not seeking to predict the probability per se of 
disclosure given a company’s independent variable characteristics, but rather to 
understand the strength and significance of the different independent variables in 
influencing the probability/likelihood of such disclosure. The regression results 
are reported in Table 6.  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
Panel A Table 6 shows that reserve balance disclosure is positively associated 
with EXPRO (coefficient =1.741, p-value = 0.014) thus disclosure for producer 
firms is greater than developer firms. Therefore we accept hypothesis one. TA 
and AUD are statistically significant but only at p<.10, all with a positive 
relationship with the reserve quantum disclosure. We find that the gearing ratio is 
negatively associated with the reserve quantum disclosure but is statistically not 
significant. We finally find that there is a positive, but statistically insignificant, 
association with EXCH which is intuitively concerning but may be explained by 
the strong univariate relationships formed by TA with the latter being the stronger 
variable leaving EXCH with little to add to the model once TA is included.  
 
Determinants of the quality of reserve quantum disclosure. Panel B Table 6 
presents the regression results for the quality of reserve quantum disclosure. In 
regard to quality of disclosure the risk of heteroskedasticity was considered in 
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regard to the residuals of the predictor variables and the analysis adjusted accordingly.   
It shows that the quality of disclosure is influenced by EXPRO having a positive 
relationship and being statistically significant (p = .001). This indicates that the 
quality of reserves disclosure for the producer firms is greater than for developer 
firms. Therefore we accept hypothesis two. For the control variables, we note that 
only TA is statistically significant (p = .002) suggesting strong evidence that large 
companies are interested in following SORP and OFR disclosure quality guidance 
on reserve quantum in their annual reports. 
 
VI. Discussion 
 
Drivers of disclosure 
 
When considering the more basic provision of the reserve balances at the year-
end there is not only a more significant take-up regarding disclosure (75.9%) but 
also several influencing variables. Of the five variables considered, the coefficient 
for EXPRO is statistically the strongest in multivariate tests and is of the expected 
sign. In addition TA and AUD are also significant but only at p < .1. The results 
suggest that non-mandatory reserve disclosure compliance is higher in companies 
at a more advanced stage in their development cycle but also, albeit with less 
statistical robustness, among larger companies and ones that are audited by the 
Big Four. Disclosure quality is seen again to be related to both stage of 
production and company size and significant at p<.01. 
 
The findings relating to the stage of production are consistent with Mirza (1999) 
and Mirza and Zimmer (2001) who contend that producer firms are more likely to 
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disclose than developer firms due to the greater levels of risk and uncertainty. 
This is despite the fact that at the developer stage there may be a greater need to 
reduce the cost of capital and to gain extra funds through reducing stakeholder 
uncertainty via disclosure, but the downside of uncertainty, potential loss of 
reputation and risk of litigation outweighs this incentive. As noted by Craswell 
and Taylor (1992) the decision to disclose reserves may not be as significant for 
explorer companies which, by definition, may not have substantial reserves.  
 
The findings relating to size in regard to reserve disclosure per se and quality of 
information disclosed are consistent with Mirza (1999), Mirza and Zimmer 
(2001) and Taylor et al. (2012). This can be explained regarding the relative costs 
of collecting the information in relation to the company’s size and resources 
(Singhvi and Desai, 1971). It is also likely that larger firms’ broader exposure to 
financial markets enforces higher disclosure requirements.  
 
The statistically significant positive relationship with the quality of external audit 
is consistent with Mirza (1999) and Taylor et al. (2012).  Craswell and Taylor 
(1992, p295) suggest that, “the demand for differentiated audit quality has been 
shown to reflect agency-cost variables used in the disclosure model” and that 
auditors will strongly encourage comprehensive disclosure to preserve their 
reputation. A further explanation of the positive relationship may be related to the 
highly complex nature of oil and gas reserve estimation. It is more likely that 
within the larger audit firms there is expertise to cope with such specialised areas 
as they have greater depth and breadth of expertise and resources than smaller 
firms (Mirza, 1999), with audit firm size and extent of audit work undertaken 
being positively related. Thus companies disclosing oil and gas reserves may 
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select large audit firms due to their capability in dealing with such a complex 
area.  
 
In the prior literature, gearing is inconsistent in direction and statistical 
significance. Our findings confirm this inconsistency in that whilst prior reserve 
balance research points to a negative statistically significant relationship with 
disclosure (Mirza, 1999; Mirza and Zimmer, 2001), this study shows similar 
signage but is not statistically significant.  
 
When companies with no reserves are excluded, only 25.3% of the companies in 
our sample achieved the disclosure recommended by the SORP/OFR. This 
therefore raises the question of the efficacy of voluntary regulation companies 
showing an unwillingness to disclose beyond that strictly required. These findings 
support Craswell and Taylor’s (1992) conclusions that considerable management 
discretion is being applied with corporations eager to maintain any such 
discretion (Cortese et al., 2010).   
 
IASB Discussion Paper 
 
IFRS 6 (IASB, 2004) is an interim standard issued pending completion of further 
investigative work with the working group’s discussion paper (IASB, 2010). 
representing the views of researchers but not having been endorsed by the IASB. 
Since the publication of the discussion paper, the IASB has consulted on the 
topics that it should include in its new agenda/workplan and reporting by 
extractive industries is not included.  The project has therefore been paused.  In 
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this section, we draw on our findings to critique some aspects of the ideas 
presented in the discussion paper.   
 
The discussion paper emphasises that reserve quantum reporting is, “the most 
important information about an entity conducting extractive activities” (IASB, 
2010, p19) and recognises the lack of relevance of historic cost accounting 
information and fair value procedures (IASB, 2010, p21). We note that 
approximately 42% of the volume of the discussion paper is given over to 
discussion of the definition and disclosure of reserve quantum, whereas previous 
deliberations have been dominated by asset recognition and valuation. This 
change in emphasis accords with the findings in the literature regarding the 
importance of reserve quantum but has been criticised by Russell and Jenkins 
(2010) for its failure to bring clarity to the definitions. 
 
The discussion paper recognises that at present there is, “no single set of 
disclosure requirement internationally” and that, “there is a wide variation in the 
quantity and type of information disclosed as well as in how that information has 
been compiled and presented” making, “it difficult for users to analyse and 
compare entities” (IASB, 2010, p106). This is corroborated by the findings of the 
UK reporting as detailed in this study. Standardisation is advocated in line with 
the existing standards of the Committee for Mineral Reserves International 
Reporting Standards (CRIRSCO) from a mineral perspective and the Petroleum 
Resource Management System (PRMS) from an oil and gas perspective, 
recognising differences relating to the scope, definitional specificity and 
assumptions applied to the estimation and classification of reserves, and 
advocating the use of consistent definitions compatible with financial reporting 
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requirements.  Concern has however been expressed about the suitability of a 
single standard to cover the unique requirements of oil and gas reporting under 
the umbrella of the extractive industries (Russell and Jenkins, 2010). 
 
The discussion paper suggests a baseline of separate disclosure of P1 (proven) 
and P2 (proven and probable) disclosure. Our findings show that of those 
companies with reserves balances, 84.1% provide the information in terms of at 
least P1 and P2 with others going beyond this (e.g. proven, probable and possible 
data), indicating that the suggested baseline should not present difficulties for the 
industry.  The discussion paper recognises the risk inherent in the estimation and 
reporting of reserves via its recommended application of confidence intervals 
(proved/ probable); the distinction between different projects requiring disclosure 
where risks (for example, geological, geographical and geopolitical) vary 
significantly; required information on assumptions applied such as price and 
production profiles; and sensitivity analysis (for example sensitivity to balances 
regarding changes in oil and gas prices). This underlines the importance of risk in 
regard to reserve quantum reporting from external stakeholders’ perspective. Risk 
is also critical to the providers of such information as shown by our findings 
where risk is seen as influential to firms’ disclosure of reserves.   
 
Table 7 compares the IASB discussion paper’s suggestions with our UK findings.  
It should be remembered that our data in Table 7 is stated after recognising that 
23 of the companies do not disclose their reserves. Geographical disaggregation is 
useful in order to gauge country-specific risks, with our findings showing that, of 
those companies that disclose their reserve balances, 77.8% provide this 
information. The discussion paper suggests a reconciliation of movements in 
 27 
reserves in the year, explaining the causes for change in reserves. Our research 
study shows that of the companies disclosing reserves, only 33.3% performed 
such a reconciliation.  The discussion paper suggests that the basis of estimation 
as well as details of the personnel involved in the estimation, including 
qualifications and level of experience, should be disclosed. In the UK at present, 
of those companies disclosing their reserve quantum, 68.2% disclose the source 
of the estimates whilst 67.7% disclose the basis of arriving at the figures.  
 
Table 7 about here 
 
An area of contention regarding the reserve disclosures is that of ensuring 
reliability.  The discussion paper, whilst recognising the influence of reserve 
information, does not advocate an audit opinion on those reserves despite having 
made earlier positive indications (Wright and Skousen, 2010). The discussion 
paper argues that audit is unnecessary because of the high cost and the degree of 
imprecision and subjective judgement involved. Like the OFR, the discussion 
paper argues that having estimates prepared by suitably qualified personnel 
should be sufficient in terms of validation of the figures. Whilst the OFR specifies 
the disclosure of the name and qualification of an independent expert who 
reviewed the internal data, we have found that 31.8% of those companies that 
disclosed balances did not provide information on the source. Given the level of 
management discretion in both the measurement of the reserves quantum and the 
discernment of commerciality, it is desirable that due governance is followed.  
 
The OFR and literature recognise the usefulness of the disclosure of KPIs such as 
the RRR.  Our findings in Table 4 show that few UK corporations choose to 
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disclose such data. The discussion paper recognises that oil and gas entities, 
“should usually be capable of replacing reserves” (IASB, 2010, p106) but does 
not make specific reference to disclosing the RRR KPI, the non-disclosure of 
which is in line with current industry practice. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
Our findings suggest that in a completely voluntary environment, disclosures 
contained in the UK’s SORP and OFR were not being complied with by the 
majority of companies. As companies have weighed up the agency benefits and 
costs they may have recognised higher proprietary and political costs in 
comparison with the agency benefits, thus choosing not to disclose. This is true 
not only of the disclosure/non-disclosure decision but also of the level of 
disclosure.  
 
Oil and gas reserves are subject to inherent risk and uncertainty. We have found 
that risk and uncertainty, as proxied by stage of production, drives the disclosure 
of reserve balances. Our results show that producer firms are more likely to 
disclose reserve quantum balances than developer firms in the same sector and 
that the quality of reserves disclosure for the producer firms in the oil and gas 
industry is significantly greater than the disclosure of the developer firms in the 
same sector. 
 
The suggestions in the IASB’s discussion paper are broadly similar to those 
contained in the UK’s SORP.  While recognising that these suggestions have not 
been endorsed by the IASB but are simply research findings, our own findings 
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suggest that those companies that currently disclose reserve data should have no 
difficulty in complying with the suggestions in the discussion paper.  However, 
our findings show that many UK companies chose not to follow the SORP and 
OFR recommendations and therefore indicate that a voluntary approach to 
disclosure will be ineffective. The authors would agree with Hussainey and 
Mouselli (2010) who argue that where information contains significant value 
relevance for stock market participants then regulators may need to make the 
OFR obligatory. The UK experience also shows the limited willingness of 
companies to provide information of the source of the information, its basis of 
calculation and KPIs, so the discussion paper’s suggestions not to require audit 
and the disclosure of KPIs would codify current custom and practice but not, in 
our view, best practice.  
 
Topics for further research include studies into the mineral extraction, as opposed 
to the oil and gas, industry; studies in a wider range of geographical areas to 
complement the prior Australian and current UK studies; studies that examine 
disclosure over larger sample sizes and over extended periods of time; and case 
studies of individual companies to explore the determinants of reserve disclosures 
and agency factors such as the incremental costs of providing further information.  
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